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The Verifiable Compliance Suite (AV-VCS) is a single encrypted, offline-verifiable deliverable for regulated long-term data (health, insurance, defense). It ships the post-quantum Substrate-2 core, the Compliance Command Center console, the records and compliance estate, and supply-chain provenance, as one licence-gated .algv bundle. Everything runs on your own infrastructure: no account with the vendor, no outbound call, no phone-home. Your Falcon-1024-signed bundle licence is both the decryption key and the runtime licence.

1. What is in the bundle (25 wheels)


2. Install

Prerequisites: a Linux host with Python 3.10+ (Docker optional but recommended for isolation), and your bundle licence saved as licence.key.
The extractor verifies your Falcon-1024 licence against the embedded issuer key (no network), decrypts, and writes the 25 wheels with integrity checks. It is fully offline and air-gap capable.
Keep the dependency pins. The post-quantum stack is sensitive to two majors that moved underneath it:
  • pqcrypto — pin below 1.0. Version 1.0.0 removed kem.ml_kem_1024 and sign.falcon_1024 entirely, which are the primitives this suite signs and seals with. An unbounded pip install pqcrypto exits successfully and then fails at first use, so the breakage looks like an application fault rather than a dependency one. The shipped wheels declare pqcrypto>=0.4.0,<1.0.
  • cryptography — floor at 50.0.0. Releases at 42.0 carry published advisories. The shipped wheels declare cryptography>=50.0.0.
If you vendor these wheels into your own mirror, carry the constraints with them. A private index that holds an older cryptography will make the install fail on the floor rather than resolve something weaker, which is the intended behaviour.
Every service is licence-gated by the same bundle licence, provided via the environment:

3. First run: the Command Center console

The console (the hub) is the operator-facing surface. Point it at a data directory and serve it over TLS. Required environment (persist these; the data dir holds keys, records and the audit chain):
Serve it (self-signed TLS shown; use a real certificate in production):
On first start the admin account is bootstrapped from the env. Browse to https://<host>:8443/ and sign in. Add the rest of the estate services (each runs under the same bundle licence, on its own port):

4. Accounts, roles and two-factor

Roles. The console has four roles: admin, compliance officer, auditor, viewer. Create accounts on the Users page (admin only). Role separation is enforced: a viewer cannot reach /users or user management (it returns 403). Two-factor sign-in (TOTP). The console discovers the TOTP add-on automatically (it ships in the bundle). On the Security page each user can Enroll: scan the QR code with an authenticator app (Google Authenticator, Authy, 1Password) or type the setup key, then confirm a 6-digit code. Enrollment is opt-in then required per user; once enrolled, password alone cannot sign in. Every enrollment and two-factor sign-in is written to the signed console audit chain. SCIM auto-provisioning (optional). The console discovers the SCIM 2.0 add-on automatically when it ships in the bundle, exposing a /scim/v2 endpoint your identity provider (Okta, Azure AD, OneLogin) uses to create, update and deactivate accounts. It authenticates with a dedicated bearer token, COMMAND_CENTER_SCIM_TOKEN (set it, or the console writes one to the data dir at mode 0600). SCIM groups map 1:1 onto the four RBAC roles, deprovisioning is a soft deactivate that blocks sign-in, and every provisioning change is written to the signed audit chain. Full setup for each provider is in the SCIM provisioning guide. Step-up re-check. Sensitive actions (evidence export, the validation pack) require a password re-check first: the console redirects to /verify, and after you confirm, the action proceeds. This is by design, not an error.

5. Console pages

APIs (/api/posture, /api/records, /api/containers, /api/ingest, /api/services, /api/updates) back the pages and are available for integration. Interactive API docs are at /docs and /redoc.

6. Security model

  • Offline, air-gap capable: verifies and decrypts with no network; no phone-home.
  • Post-quantum signing: Falcon-1024 and ML-DSA-65 keep evidence verifiable for decades; .acv containers use ML-KEM-1024.
  • Write-once, tamper-evident: records are content-addressed, encrypted at rest, RFC-3161 timestamped, offline-verifiable; a legal hold blocks deletion, and disposal leaves a signed erasure tombstone.
  • Signed audit chain: every privileged action is hash-linked; re-verify from the Audit page or via the validation pack.
  • RBAC + step-up + TOTP 2FA, as above.
  • Optional SIEM forwarding: stream the signed audit chain to your SOC over syslog (RFC 5424 / CEF) or webhook when configured.
  • Bring-your-own-key custody: HSM, KMS, HashiCorp Vault, PKCS#11 adapters for the doc archive.

7. Supply chain and disaster recovery

  • SBOM + provenance: the download ships sbom.cyclonedx.json, sbom.spdx.json, and a SLSA v1 provenance.json signed with the AlgoVoi release key (provenance.sig.json, key in release_pubkey.json). Load the SBOM into Dependency-Track / Grype / Trivy, or verify offline with algovoi-sbom verify.
  • DR: DR_RUNBOOK.md in the bundle documents RTO/RPO, backup and restore, and the signed key-ceremony and backup-restore attestation chain.
  • Volume import: docs/USAGE.md (bulk import a document estate) and docs/SECURE_INGEST.md (hardened per-tenant SFTP/rsync landing zone). The console Import tab drives these too.

8. Verification checklist (what a clean install proves)

Run these after install to confirm the deployment is healthy: This exact sequence was run against a fresh clean install of the shipping bundle and passed on every line, including two-factor enrollment.