Records Vault

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What it is

• Independent proof of when — RFC-3161 trusted timestamps from a third-party authority.
• Proof of who read it — a signed, tamper-evident read-access audit log.
• Defensible preservation — legal / e-discovery holds that override routine disposal.

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What you get

• Proof of existence-by-a-date you don’t have to vouch for. An RFC-3161 token from a third-party Time-Stamping Authority binds the record’s hash to that authority’s time. The token is stored verbatim for independent verification; the vault additionally proves, offline, that the token’s message imprint is exactly this record’s hash.
• A read trail regulators ask for. Write-integrity proves a record wasn’t altered; it says nothing about who read it. Records Vault logs every retrieve — principal, record, granted or denied, reason — as signed evidence, exportable as JSON-lines for your SIEM / GRC (a HIPAA access report).
• Holds that actually hold. A matter hold overrides the retention schedule: a held record is never disposable, and the hold can’t be released until its preservation floor elapses — the litigation-hold pattern, recorded as tamper-evident evidence rather than a database flag.
• Air-gap preserved. Timestamping degrades to a signed air-gap record with no external call; the vault works fully offline. The TSA is optional, exactly as S3/Object-Lock is on the base archive.
• One bundle, two verticals. Health and legal buy the same code, differing only in config presets (retention tables, consent terms). No fork.

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The preservation features

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Launch core

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Health & legal depth

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How it works

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Verify it yourself

pip install pqcrypto rfc8785

python verify_evidence_pack.py

======================================================================
AlgoVoi Records Vault — offline evidence verification
  public key kid: 8bd26d25651adb39  (Falcon-1024, 1793 bytes)
  verifier deps : pqcrypto + rfc8785 only — NO AlgoVoi code, NO secret, NO service
======================================================================
  [PASS] archive_chain.json  archive_entry       1 entries, head=sha256:e04693…
  [PASS] tsa_chain.json      vault_tsa_token     1 entries, head=sha256:1d0685…
  [PASS] access_chain.json   vault_access_event  2 entries, head=sha256:661b86…
  [PASS] holds_chain.json    vault_legal_hold    1 entries, head=sha256:39b3f8…
  [PASS] timestamp binding   every tsa.messageImprint == SHA-256(JCS) of its archive receipt
======================================================================
RESULT: ALL EVIDENCE VERIFIED OFFLINE (public key only)
======================================================================

  [PASS] archive_chain.json  archive_entry       1 entries, head=sha256:e04693…
  [PASS] tsa_chain.json      vault_tsa_token     1 entries, head=sha256:1d0685…
  [FAIL] access_chain.json   vault_access_event  bad_signature@0
  [PASS] holds_chain.json    vault_legal_hold    1 entries, head=sha256:39b3f8…
RESULT: VERIFICATION FAILED — evidence is altered or inconsistent

def verify_chain(envelopes, public_key, entry_type, prev_field):
    prev = None
    for i, env in enumerate(envelopes):
        payload, sig, _ = open_envelope(env)                       # decode the signed envelope
        if payload["type"] != entry_type:        return False, f"wrong_type@{i}"
        if not falcon_verify(public_key, jcs(payload), sig): return False, f"bad_signature@{i}"
        if payload["seq"] != i:                   return False, f"seq_mismatch@{i}"
        if payload[prev_field] != prev:           return False, f"chain_break@{i}"
        prev = "sha256:" + sha256(jcs(payload)).hexdigest()        # link to the next entry
    return True, f"{len(envelopes)} entries verified"

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Canonical form verified across 8 independent implementations

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Portable evidence export (add-on)

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Records Vault vs Recovery Vault

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Honest non-claims

• Not a DMS. No search, versioned editing, workflow, viewer, or folders.
• Evidence, not certification. It supports HIPAA / GDPR / eIDAS evidence; certification remains the buyer’s and their counsel’s. No “HIPAA BAA / eIDAS-qualified” claim without a separate legal track.
• Tamper-evident, not hard-WORM — except where you enable S3 Object-Lock (Compliance mode), in which case we say so.
• Air-gap preserved. The TSA and S3/Object-Lock stay optional; the vault works fully offline. No managed SaaS, no key escrow beyond the existing opt-in Recovery Vault.
• 8-language canonical-form, not 8-language signature. A real receipt’s JCS canonical bytes reproduce byte-identically across eight implementations; the Falcon-1024 signature is verified with the published Python reference (post-quantum signature libraries are not yet broadly available across languages).

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Who it’s for

• Healthcare — long-lived immutable patient records with a provable read-access trail (HIPAA §164.312(b)), retention overrides for active matters, and air-gapped on-prem deployment.
• Legal, IP & contracts — proof a document existed on a date (RFC-3161), litigation holds by matter, and a chain of evidence opposing counsel can verify independently.
• Any regulated team that must preserve records and prove the preservation — to an auditor or a court — without trusting the storage vendor or the server clock.

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Get Records Vault