> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.algovoi.co.uk/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# AlgoVoi Reseal: quantum-seal the documents you already have

> Re-anchor documents already signed with RSA or ECDSA into post-quantum, RFC-3161 timestamped, offline-verifiable attestations, before a quantum adversary can forge the original signature. Free open verifier plus a licensed sealer.

AlgoVoi Reseal quantum-seals evidence you already hold. Every post-quantum
product on the market protects tomorrow's data; Reseal rescues yesterday's. A
document signed with RSA or ECDSA stays provable only while those algorithms
stay unforgeable. Records on decade-long retention clocks (contracts, clinical
records, deeds, qualified e-signatures) outlive that window: once a quantum
adversary can forge the classical signature, the original can no longer be told
apart from a tamper. The rescue is only possible now, while the classical
signature still verifies. Reseal verifies it today and binds that verification
into a Falcon-1024 + ML-DSA (65 or 87), RFC-3161 timestamped, offline-verifiable
attestation.

## Two parts: an open verifier and a licensed sealer

|            | Package                 | Licence            | What it does                                                         |
| ---------- | ----------------------- | ------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Verify** | `algovoi-reseal-verify` | Apache-2.0, public | Inspect classical signatures and verify reseal attestations, offline |
| **Seal**   | `algovoi-reseal`        | Commercial         | Mint the post-quantum attestations                                   |

Verification is open on purpose: you should not have to trust the sealer. Anyone
can verify what a seal proves, from the bytes alone, with no AlgoVoi service in
the trust path.

## Verify or inspect (free, open)

```bash theme={null}
pip install algovoi-reseal-verify

# What's signed on this document, does it verify today, how exposed is it?
av-reseal-verify inspect contract.pdf

# Verify a reseal attestation offline
av-reseal-verify verify contract.pdf.reseal.json --file contract.pdf --expect-kid sha256:...
```

Exit codes: `0` verified and anchored, `1` failed, `2` malformed, `3`
cryptographically intact but the signing key is self-asserted (pin the sealer's
published `kid` with `--expect-kid` to anchor authenticity).

## Seal (licensed)

After purchase on the [Suite Store](https://api.algovoi.co.uk/suite-store) you
receive an index token and a licence key. Install the sealer from the token-gated
AlgoVoi index (its public dependencies come from PyPI):

```bash theme={null}
pip install \
  --index-url https://<your-index-token>@api.algovoi.co.uk/pkgs/simple/ \
  --extra-index-url https://pypi.org/simple/ \
  algovoi-reseal
```

<Warning>
  The index token is a secret. Prefer configuring it out of the command line so it
  does not land in shell history or CI logs, for example with `pip config` or a
  `PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL` / netrc entry, rather than pasting it inline.
</Warning>

Then set your licence and seal:

```bash theme={null}
export ALGOVOI_LICENSE_KEY="<your-licence-key>"

av-reseal keygen --mldsa-level 65        # your post-quantum identity
av-reseal seal contract.pdf              # -> contract.pdf.reseal.json (RFC-3161 stamped)
av-reseal verify contract.pdf.reseal.json --file contract.pdf
```

Sealing requires a valid licence; inspection and verification never do.

## Two signing profiles

Both are first-class; the verifier accepts either and neither can be downgraded
(the algorithm set is bound inside the signed payload).

| Profile               | `--mldsa-level` | Signatures              | Level   | Trade-off                                |
| --------------------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | ------- | ---------------------------------------- |
| **Compact** (default) | `65`            | Falcon-1024 + ML-DSA-65 | L5 + L3 | smaller seals                            |
| **Matched**           | `87`            | Falcon-1024 + ML-DSA-87 | L5 + L5 | both at NIST L5; \~+1.3 KB per signature |

## What it understands

* PDF embedded signatures (PAdES / PKCS#7): every `/ByteRange` CMS signature,
  with a shadow-attack partial-coverage check and a SHA-1 weak-digest flag.
* Detached CMS (`.p7s`) over any file.
* Optional offline trust-path and CRL revocation validation (`--trust-roots`,
  `--crl`) — air-gap capable, no OCSP fetch.
* Optional RFC-3161 time anchoring (`--tsa-roots`); unanchored timestamps are
  labelled, never presented as authoritative.

## Trust model, stated honestly

An attestation carries its signing public key, so verification proves it is
internally consistent and unaltered, not who sealed it. Anchor authenticity by
pinning the sealer's published `kid` (`--expect-kid`, a full 256-bit digest).
The dual signature is bound inside the signed payload, so ML-DSA cannot be
stripped to fall back to Falcon-only. Signatures cross-verify against liboqs
(Open Quantum Safe) in both directions.

Reseal produces cryptographic evidence artifacts. It is not a guarantee of legal
admissibility or regulatory compliance; treat each attestation as a per-record,
independently verifiable proof.

## Standards

RFC 8785 (JCS), RFC 3161 (timestamping), RFC 5652 (CMS), RFC 5280 (X.509),
FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), FIPS 206 draft (FN-DSA / Falcon).